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on the punitive damages/compensatory damages ratio, which reduced the annual number of blockbuster
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1.  Introduction 
  By their very nature, punitive damages awards tend to be large.  Punitive damages 
awards usually arise in cases where juries perceive the conduct to be particularly 
egregious, and the compensatory damages associated with such cases are often great as 
well.  If the purpose of the award is to punish defendants for severe harms or to provide 
incentives to deter the conduct that led to these harms, then one would expect these 
awards to be reasonably substantial in absolute terms but not necessarily large relative to 
the value of compensatory damages.  From the standpoint of economic efficiency, the 
appropriate relation between punitive damages and compensatory damages will depend 
on the probability of detecting and punishing the behavior to provide the appropriate 
economic incentives as well as perhaps on factors other than deterrence, such as 
punishment.
1  
Although punitive damages could serve a constructive role in some 
circumstances, there have been signals that the process for setting punitive damages may 
have gone awry.  Whereas punitive awards for $1 million or more formerly garnered 
news attention, awards at even higher levels than that have become quite common.  The 
extreme outliers involve much greater stakes than $1 million.  Hersch and Viscusi (2004) 
and Viscusi (2004) developed tabulations of what they called the “blockbuster punitive 
damages awards,” which were those punitive awards of at least $100 million.  
Notwithstanding this quite high cutoff, they identified 64 blockbuster awards as of 2004.  
In this article, we update and analyze the blockbuster punitive damages award tally 
through 2008, which now includes 100 blockbuster awards.   
                                                 
1 Polinsky and Shavell (1998) summarize the economic theory of punitive damages. 2 
 
  The emergence of blockbuster awards has been coupled with a series of studies 
that have questioned the ability of jurors to set punitive damages levels such as these in a 
meaningful way.  Although jurors often are able to form reasonable judgments regarding 
the reprehensibility of behavior, they have difficulty in mapping these concerns into a 
level of punitive damages in a consistent manner.
2 Jurors also are subject to a variety of 
behavioral anomalies, such as hindsight bias, which may lead to a judgment after the fact 
that the behavior is more blameworthy than it actually is.
3 Anchoring effects also may be 
influential to the extent that irrelevant anchors provided by plaintiffs’ attorneys serve as a 
form of guidance to jurors in search of a damages number.
4 Unfortunately, jury 
instructions do not provide the type of meaningful guidance needed to overcome these 
shortcomings. 
  Extremely large punitive awards may have substantial economic consequences.  
A sufficiently large award may threaten the solvency of the firm.  Short of such 
catastrophic effects on the viability of the firm, very high damages awards deter 
innovation and the introduction of novel products that may be subject to the risk of large 
awards, as novel technologies appear to be harder hit than older, but possibly riskier, 
technologies.
5 Costs to consumers also are increased by high damages amounts, to the 
extent that companies’ expectations of liability costs raise product prices.
6 Because of 
                                                 
2 Sunstein et al. (2002) provide a series of results based on controlled jury experiments that explore a wide 
variety of limitations in how juries set punitive damages. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 See Viscusi and Moore (1993) for an empirical analysis of the effect of liability costs on innovations, such 
as patents and new product introductions.  Some firms have also reduced their production of vaccines in 
response to liability costs.  See Manning (1994) for discussion of the effects of tort liability on the 
production of childhood vaccines. 
6 Rubin et al. (1997) provide a thorough analysis of the law and economics of the effect of punitive 
damages on prices. 3 
 
their unpredictability, punitive awards may have little constructive effect in promoting 
efficient behaviors, such as appropriate levels of product safety.
7  
  Controversies over the appropriateness of punitive damages awards combined 
with the size of the awards and the economic repercussions from very large awards have 
prompted several U.S. Supreme Court reviews of cases involving punitive damages.  The 
decisions in the early 1990s generally supported the awards, but subsequent decisions 
focused on whether there should be limits on the ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages.
8  In the 1991 decision in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company 
v. Haslip, the Court concluded that a ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages 
of four to one was not improper.
9  The 1993 decision in TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. 
Corp. affirmed a punitive damages judgment in which the ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages was over 526.
10 In 1996 in BMW of N. Am., Inc.  v. Gore, the 
Court remarked that the “most commonly cited indicium of an unreasonable or excessive 
punitive damages award is its ratio to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff.”
11 
Subsequently, the 2003 U.S. Supreme Court Decision in State Farm v. Campbell issued 
more precise guidance for the reasonableness of punitive damages awards based on this 
ratio, which the court believed should not exceed a single-digit ratio: “Our jurisprudence 
and the principles it has now established demonstrate, however, that in practice few 
                                                 
7Viscusi (1998a,b) examines the weak incentive effects of punitive damages empirically. 
8 In addition to its rulings on the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, in 2007 the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided that a jury can consider harm to non-parties when deciding how reprehensible the conduct of 
the defendant, but it cannot consider such harm in determining the level of punitive damages.  See Philip 
Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).  This decision has resulted in the reversal and a new trial 
to determine punitive damages in Bullock v. Philip Morris, Inc. (Cal Ct. App., No. B164398, 1/30/08), a 
case analyzed in this paper. 
9 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
10 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993). 
11 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).  Eisenberg and Wells (1999) found no effect of the 
BMW decision on the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages based on a sample of published 
opinions.  4 
 
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a 
significant degree, will satisfy due process.”
12 In 2008 the U.S. Supreme Court supported 
a punitive damages/compensatory damages maximum ratio of 1.0 in Exxon Shipping Co. 
v. Baker, which it viewed as an appropriate upper bound ratio for maritime oil spill 
cases.
13 In her opinion that dissented in part, Justice Ginsburg hypothesized that the 1:1 
ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages might have broader applicability in 
future cases:  “On next opportunity, will the Court rule, definitively, that 1:1 is the ceiling 
due process requires in all of the States, and for all federal claims?”
14   
Our focus on the implications of the recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions is 
twofold.  First, we analyze the trends in the blockbuster awards throughout the era in 
which blockbuster awards have occurred to identify the determinants of these awards as 
well as whether there has been any decline in these very large awards in the wake of the 
State Farm case.  Second, we explore the implications of Justice Ginsburg’s conjecture 
by also undertaking an analysis of how a lower ratio of 1:1 based on the Exxon Shipping 
Co. v. Baker decision would affect blockbuster awards if this ratio were applied more 
generally. 
Whereas the main focus of the previous studies of blockbuster awards was 
primarily on the overall distribution of awards, this article examines their economic 
underpinnings.  How responsive is the magnitude of the blockbuster awards to the level 
of compensatory damages? Are particular industries subject to larger punitive awards 
even after taking into account the level of compensatory damages?   Have the number of 
                                                 
12 State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 425 (2003). 
13 Exxon Shipping Company, et al., Petitioners v. Grant Baker et al. No. 07-219, Supreme Court of the 
United States (2008 U.S. LEXIS 5263). 
14 Ibid. 5 
 
blockbuster awards been on the rise or have they become less frequent? Has the total 
amount of the blockbuster awards exhibited a rising or falling trend over time? If there 
has been a trend, is it related to the State Farm decision, which one would have expected 
to lead to a dampening of blockbuster awards? The overall result is that such awards have 
been on the rise, but after the State Farm decision there has been a statistically significant 
drop in the number of blockbuster punitive damages awards, their amount, and the ratio 
of punitive damages to compensatory damages. 
 
2.  An Inventory of Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards 
The set of blockbuster cases with punitive damages awards of $100 million or 
more (in nominal dollars) was found through a wide-ranging search of a number of 
sources including, but not limited to, the following: LEXIS combined jury verdicts and 
settlements, Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw databases, Lawyers Weekly USA, and 
VerdictSearch’s annual “Top 100 Jury Verdicts” for 2006, 2007, and 2008.  Basic case 
information, such as the year of the award, amounts of punitive and compensatory 
awards, and type of industry involved was drawn mainly from news articles and 
published court opinions.  We identified 100 blockbuster punitive damages awards for 
the time period January, 1985 through December, 2008.  We have not identified any 
blockbuster awards before 1985.  Table 1 lists the blockbuster awards by year.  Appendix 
Table A1 sorts these awards by the size of the award.   6 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the blockbuster punitive damages awards 
for the sample, where all awards have been converted to 2008 dollars.
15  Due to the 
enormous range of the award amounts, the figure plots the frequency of the natural log of 
punitive damages awards on the horizontal axis.  For reference, the scale at the top of the 
graph indicates the corresponding levels of punitive damages.  Even using a logarithmic 
scale, the distribution of punitive damages is greatly skewed right, or positively skewed.  
Almost 20 percent of the awards have real values less than or equal to $150 million, and 
the vast majority (73 percent) of the awards fall under the $500 million mark.  Nearly 85 
percent of the awards are less than or equal to $1 billion, but there are 6 cases (6 percent 
of the sample) that exceed $5 billion in 2008 dollars.   
Table 2 summarizes the distribution of the punitive damages awards by type of 
defendant.  In almost all instances, the defendant in punitive damages cases is a corporate 
entity rather than an individual or a government agency.  One-fourth of the awards in the 
sample are against firms in the energy or chemical industry.  The 1995 punitive damages 
award against Exxon Corporation, which has since become the Exxon Mobil 
Corporation, of $5.0 billion for damages related to the Exxon Valdez oil spill is perhaps 
the best known of these awards.  However, this is by no means the only such award in the 
multi-billion dollar range for firms in the energy and chemical industry.  There was also 
an $11.8 billion punitive damages award in 2003 for Exxon’s alleged accounting 
violations in Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Alabama Department of Conservation and 
Natural Resources, a $3.4 billion punitive damages award in 1997 in In re New Orleans 
                                                 
15 The inflation adjustment factors are based on the Consumer Price Index, All Urban Consumers (CPI-U). 
Authors’ calculations from data downloaded from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
<http://www.bls.gov/cpi/#tables>. 7 
 
Tank Car Leakage Fire Litigation, and a $3 billion award in 1985 in Pennzoil v. Texaco.  
These cases involve a mix of financial harms or serious environmental harms. 
Firms in the finance, investment, and insurance industry account for close to one-
fourth of all blockbuster punitive damages awards.  The 1996 State Farm case is perhaps 
the best known of these 23 blockbuster award cases.  The largest punitive award in this 
group is a $2.1 billion bench award against members of the Uzan family of Turkey in 
2003 for fraud in loan transactions with Motorola Credit Corporation; this award was 
later reduced to $1 billion, an amount upheld by a federal appeals court.
16 The mean 
punitive damages amount for these cases is $546.3 million, approximately one-third of 
the level for the energy and chemical industry punitive damages mean.  Also, the mean 
ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is about two-thirds of the ratio for the energy 
and chemical industry, but the average ratio is still in the double digits, above the State 
Farm single digit guidelines. 
The third largest industry group of firms in terms of the number of blockbuster 
punitive damages awards consists of those firms in the pharmaceutical or health care 
industry, which account for 16 blockbuster cases.
17  The magnitude of these awards is 
about the same as for the finance, investment, and insurance industry category.  The 
prominence of the pharmaceutical and health care industry is not surprising, as litigation 
involving medical malpractice, medical devices, and prescription drugs has long been 
noted as being a major contributor to perceptions of the existence of a tort liability 
crisis.
18  Whether there is or has been a so-called “crisis” is beyond the scope of this 
                                                 
16 Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26867. 
17 This category also includes professional medical practitioners or medical practices.   
18 See Manning (1994) for further discussion of this industry.  More generally, Kakalik and Pace (1986) 
and Hensler et al. (1987) review the areas of tort liability that have generated the largest costs. 8 
 
article, except to the extent that the analysis here indicates that there is evidence of an 
imbalance between the punitive damages and compensatory damages amounts for the 
blockbuster cases affecting this industry.  Within the set of firms with punitive damages 
at the blockbuster level, pharmaceutical and health care firms are well represented but are 
by no means outliers in terms of the magnitude of the awards.   
By far the greatest outlier category is the cigarette industry.  The five blockbuster 
awards average $44.5 billion, and even after excluding the $145 billion award in the 
Engle Florida class action in 2000, the mean punitive damages value is $10.2 billion.  
The smallest of the cigarette blockbuster punitive damages awards is $150 million in the 
2002 case, Schwarz v. Philip Morris, Inc., in the state of Oregon.  This award is 
nevertheless strikingly large given that it is an individual smoker case.  The imbalance 
between the punitive damages and compensatory damages in this case is reflected in the 
case’s ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, which is 882.4.  The second 
smallest blockbuster cigarette award is the $3 billion award in the 2001 individual 
smoker case, Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc.  The ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages in this California case was 541.5, or two orders of magnitude 
beyond the single digit guidance in the State Farm case.  The largest punitive damages 
award in an individual smoker case was the $28 billion award in 2002 in Bullock v. Philip 
Morris, Inc.  This case, which involved the same plaintiff’s attorney, Michael Piuze, as in 
the Boeken individual smoker cigarette case, had a ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages of approximately 43,000, which is the highest ratio for any 
blockbuster punitive damages award.
19  A very large cigarette punitive damages award 
                                                 
19 We have excluded Garamendi v. Altus Finance, S.A. from this comparison; since compensatory damages 
were zero in this case, the ratio is infinite.   9 
 
was in the 2003 Illinois “lights” cigarette class action, Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., in 
which the judge in this Madison County, Illinois bench trial awarded $3.1 billion in 
punitive damages, with a ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages of 0.4.
20 
The final blockbuster cigarette award was the $145 billion award in Engle v. Philip 
Morris, Inc. That case’s punitive damages/compensatory damages ratio of 11,417.3 
overstates the actual ratio that would be observed if it were possible to calculate the full 
value of compensatory damages for the entire class and not just the compensatory 
damages for the class representatives, which was the focus of the jury award.  Of all the 
blockbuster cigarette awards, only the punitive damages/compensatory damages ratio in 
the Price case would be under the single-digit State Farm threshold, and all other 
punitive awards for the cigarette industry are at the triple-digit level or beyond.  The 
cigarette industry has experienced particularly extreme blockbuster awards in terms of 
their levels, but the industry has not had as many awards of this type as have some 
broader industry groups in Table 2. 
  Our data set includes seven unusual cases involving punitive damages against the 
perpetrators of violent crimes.  The largest punitive award in this category was in Swan v. 
                                                 
20 This very high award in a bench trial is one of two bench trials and one of twelve punitive awards in the 
sample in excess of $1 billion (in nominal dollars).  The role of a Madison County judgment in terms of its 
outlier status is not too surprising given Madison County’s reputation as “The Lawsuit Capital of the 
World” and “Class Action Paradise,” as noted by Amalia Deligiannis, “Madison County: A Corporation’s 
Worst Nightmare,” 14 Corp. Legal Times 52 (2004).  Other designations of Madison County as the number 
one “Judicial Hellhole” and a “jackpot jurisdiction” have been provided by the American Tort Reform 
Association, Bringing Justice to Judicial Hellholes 2003, at 3 (2003).  The Illinois Supreme Court 
overturned Judge Byron’s verdict and in August, 2007 turned down a request by plaintiffs to reopen the 
case.  Illinois also has been a prominent state for class actions.  In 1995-1996, based on reported judicial 
decisions, Illinois ranked first in terms of the number of consumer cases, third in torts, and second in 
securities.  The 1996-1997 Illinois class action rankings were first in consumer cases, second in torts, and 
fifth in securities.  Illinois ranked in the top five states in terms of the frequency of class actions per 
population for all these groupings.  See Hensler et al. (2000).  With respect to medical malpractice cases, 
Vidmar (2005) found that an analysis of Madison County and St. Clair County produced “no evidence to 
support the perception that medical malpractice jury awards in these counties are frequent or that jury 
verdicts for plaintiffs are outrageous.”  Medical malpractice cases do not figure prominently in punitive 
damages awards, in general, but six of the blockbuster cases in Table 1 are medical malpractice cases. 10 
 
Einhorn in 1999.  The parents of the victim were awarded $155 million in compensatory 
damages and $752 million in punitive damages in a civil trial.  The second largest verdict 
was handed down in 2004 in Brown v. Dorsey.  That case involved a conspiracy by 
sheriff’s department employees culminating in the murder of the sheriff-elect.  The civil 
trial in 2004 led to a judgment of $326.1 million in compensatory damages and $450 
million in punitive damages against the former sheriff and two co-conspirators.  Two 
2008 blockbuster awards, Estate of Mack v. Mack  and Estate of LoCascio v. LoCascio, 
involved children of murder victims seeking damages from family members who were 
convicted of murdering their mothers. The punitive damages awarded in Mack equaled 
$405 million (with compensatory damages of $185 million), and in LoCascio the punitive 
damages award was $100 million (with compensatory damages of $25.1 million).  
Another $100 million punitive damages award was given to a murder victim’s family in 
the 2006 “American Beauty” case, de Villers v. Rossum.
21 The remaining two violent 
crime cases were a 2007 sexual battery civil case, Martin v. Swain and a 2008 wrongful-
death claim against the Cuban government and its leaders, the Estate of del Pino v. The 
Republic of Cuba. In the Martin case the verdict was $155 million in compensatory 
damages and $100 million in punitive damages against a father for many years of sexual 
abuse of his daughter.  In the del Pino case, the award of $252.5 million, $250 in punitive 
damages alone, was given to the children of a man who was allegedly tortured and killed 
by hanging by the Cuban government.  The ratios of punitive damages to compensatory 
damages in these cases are generally small relative to the other blockbuster cases, ranging 
from 1.4 in Brown v. Dorsey to 16.7 in de Villers v. Rossum. An exception is the case 
                                                 
21 Rossum, the murderer, attempted to make de Villers’ death appear to be a suicide by placing a wedding 
photo, her opened diary indicating their marriage was failing, and rose petals near her husband’s body.  See 
Natalie White, “$106 Million in ‘American Beauty’ Murder,” Lawyers Weekly USA, April 24, 2006.   11 
 
against the Cuban government, which has a ratio of 100.  Excluding the latter award, 
which is unusual in that the defendant is a foreign government, the mean ratio for the 
other six violent crime punitive damages awards is 6.5 and the median ratio is 4.4. 
  These violent crime cases are clearly different from other blockbuster punitive 
damages awards and the group shares a number of characteristics.  All but Martin v. 
Swain concerned a highly visible, publicity-generating murder, and in all, liability is 
already established in the civil trial, as each defendant had already been convicted and 
was serving lengthy terms.  Also, these cases are the only ones in the data set in which 
both litigants are individuals rather than corporate or government parties.
22  In the murder 
cases, family members of the victims claim a key purpose of the civil suit, and for 
seeking punitive damages in particular, is to make sure that the murderer can never profit 
from the murder.  In fact, the plaintiff’s attorney in the Einhorn case claimed that Einhorn 
had been approached to write a book about the case, enabling him to profit from the 
murder.
23 The plaintiffs in de Villers v. Rossum brought in testimony from a professor of 
marketing about Rossum’s potential earnings through selling her story to various national 
media or selling movie or book rights.  The Brown family’s attorney said in an interview, 
“‘Let’s be honest: nobody has this type of money…But as I discussed with the jury, and I 
think they understood, this prevents any of the defendants from ever profiting from any 
sort of media deal…’” 
24 Other reasons for the verdicts, noted by attorneys and family 
members, are to reflect the egregious nature of the crime and to ‘send a message,’ with 
the avowed intent of deterring future crimes.  One juror in the case against the Cuban 
                                                 
22 The exception in this group is the del Pino award which involved a national government as a defendant 
and which did not have a criminal trial proceeding. 
23 Alan Fisk, “Pressing on for a fugitive’s debt: Ira Einhorn owes $907 million.  But how much is 
collectible?” National Law Journal, Volume 23, Number 51, August 13, 2001. 
24 “Top Ten Jury Verdicts of 2004,” Lawyers Weekly USA, October 24, 2005. 12 
 
government  noted that they wanted to send a “political statement.”
25 None of these 
plaintiffs has received any compensation to date. 
  Several states have reputations for having courts in which plaintiffs seeking large 
awards have more favorable prospects.  Consistent with this view, Table 3 shows that the 
distribution of the awards does differ substantially across states, as blockbuster awards 
tend to be concentrated geographically.  Exactly half the states (25 states) have had any 
blockbuster punitive damages awards.  California and Texas are the leading states in 
terms of the total number of blockbuster cases, with 21 in California and 20 in Texas.   
California has the highest total value blockbuster punitive damages award, $49.7 billion, 
over four times greater than the total value of the punitive damages for Texas and nearly 
3 times greater than the state with the second highest total value, Alabama.   
  It is interesting to compare the California and Texas experiences with that of New 
York.  These three states have the largest populations, and California and New York both 
have been the site of prominent cigarette cases.  However, New York has had only two 
blockbuster punitive damages awards.  The average per capita value of the total 
blockbuster punitive damages awards in the state from 1985–2008 is $136 in New York, 
as compared to $1,429 in California, more than 10 times higher.  This and other per 
capita damages amounts in Table 3 pertain to the average across the 24 years in the 
sample of the total blockbuster award amounts in 2008 dollars, divided by the state’s 
population in the year of the awards.  The per capita value of the total damages in Texas 
is $629, as most of these awards tend to be at or just above the $100 million lower bound 
to be in the sample, which is still 4.6 times greater than for New York State.  The 
                                                 
25 “Jury in Florida awards nearly $253 million to children of Castro foe who died in Cuban jail,” Associated 
Press, April 5, 2008. 13 
 
empirical analysis below will examine whether Texas and California are outliers 
controlling for other case characteristics, such as the industry involved.   
Table 4 describes other key characteristics of the 100 blockbuster cases, including 
the Engle case.  Some of the breakdowns are of interest even though they did not prove to 
be statistically significant in the regression analysis reported below.  In terms of the types 
of damages sought,  10 percent were for environmental harm, 40 percent were personal 
injury and fatality cases, and 50 percent were cases involving monetary damages for 
pecuniary harms.  Six percent of the cases involved individual litigants in which private 
individuals were both plaintiffs and defendants; these correspond to the violent crime 
cases discussed above, excluding the del Pino award.  The most common pattern 
involved individuals paired against corporate or business entities, as 53 percent of the 
cases involved an individual plaintiff and a business or corporate defendant.
26  The 
remainder of the cases involved plaintiffs and defendants who were both business or 
government entities.   
 
3.  Temporal Trends of Blockbuster Punitive Damages 
Blockbuster punitive damages are a comparatively new phenomenon.  The first 
punitive damages award that we have identified as breaking the $100 million barrier was 
in 1985.
27 The two blockbuster awards in 1985 were in the California case, Micro/Vest v. 
ComputerLand, and a $3 billion award in the highly publicized case of Pennzoil v. 
Texaco.  As the awards roster in Table 1 indicates, no awards earned blockbuster status in 
                                                 
26 This group also includes the del Pino award which involved individuals against a national government 
and its leaders. In the interest of simplicity, the label on this variable in the regressions below is “Individual 
and Business Litigants.” 
27 While there may have been an earlier blockbuster award, this is the first award identified in the searches 
for this paper or in Hersch and Viscusi (2004) or Viscusi (2004). 14 
 
1986, 1987, 1990, or 1992, so in the early blockbuster awards era the number of punitive 
awards meeting that criterion were not great.  However, after 1992 every year through 
2008 has had at least one award at the blockbuster level.   
While the 2003 U.S. Supreme Court State Farm decision is relatively recent, 31 
percent of the sample of blockbuster cases came in 2004 or thereafter, providing a basis 
for assessing whether there has been a shift in the punitive damages landscape after this 
decision, holding fixed other case characteristics.  The exploration below will not only 
compare the performance of the blockbuster cases before and after the State Farm 
decision, but will also assess whether the emergence of blockbuster cases has been 
affected by the State Farm decision, as one might expect. 
Figure 2 illustrates the temporal trend in the number of blockbuster awards by 
year.  The number of blockbuster awards in any given year tends to be small, reaching a 
peak of 12 in 1999, with 8 occurring in 2003, but never more than 7 in any other year.  
Because of the small numbers, one should be cautious in generalizing with respect to the 
overall trend in the absence of a formal statistical analysis that distinguishes which 
effects are statistically significant and which are not.  For example, there are few awards 
in 1997 and 1998 before the spike in awards in 1999, and there are few awards in two of 
the years after 1999.  The 1999 spike in awards did not start a new upward trend, but the 
tripling in the number of blockbuster awards in 1999 from the levels in the previous two 
years may not be entirely random either. 
What may have accounted for a jump in punitive damages awards in 1999? One 
hypothesis is that the Master Settlement Agreement in the cigarette litigation at the end of 
1998 may have led juries to think in terms of billions rather than millions in setting 15 
 
damages awards.  The lawsuits filed by the states seeking to recoup damages relating to 
the states’ share of the Medicaid costs of smoking were settled for over $200 billion, 
including $206 billion to 46 states, $36.8 billion to four states that settled individually, as 
well as other costs.
28 If jurors use the value of this highly publicized settlement as an 
anchor in setting punitive damages awards,
29 then one would expect both the frequency 
and the level of blockbuster awards to rise after this settlement.   
There are two special cases that will be distinguished in the subsequent statistical 
analysis because their ratios of punitive damages to compensatory damages are 
misleading or undefined.  First, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. is a Florida tobacco 
class action case in which the compensatory damages amount of $12.7 million pertains to 
the class representatives, while the punitive damages amount of $145 billion is for the 
entire class.  Thus, while the punitive damages value is pertinent, the ratio of punitive 
damages to compensatory damages will be misleading and overstated.  The Engle case 
also involved the largest punitive damages value in the sample, and including it in some 
of the analyses may distort the average performance of the sample in terms of measures 
such as the mean damages value.  Second, there are some statistical problems raised in 
the subsequent analyses by Garamendi v. Altus Finance, S.A., which had zero 
compensatory damages and $700 million in punitive damages.  As a result, the ratio of 
punitive damages to compensatory damages for this case is infinite.  At different 
junctures below, we will present results with and without these cases in the sample, as is 
appropriate.   
                                                 
28 See Viscusi (2002) for a breakdown of these costs. 
29 See Sunstein et al. (2002) for discussion of experimental results demonstrating anchoring effects on 
punitive damages. 16 
 
Table 5 summarizes the general characteristics of the blockbuster awards and 
their pattern before and after the pivotal State Farm case.  Panel A provides the 
characteristics of the full sample, while Panels B and C, respectively, summarize the 
comparable statistics before and after the 2003 State Farm decision.  As noted earlier, to 
ensure comparability, we converted all award values reported in tables and used in the 
regressions to 2008 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.  The mean punitive damages 
amount across all cases excluding the Engle case is $1.2 billion, and is $3.0 billion 
including that case.  The median blockbuster award value is considerably less, reflecting 
the highly skewed nature of the distribution of blockbuster awards.  The punitive 
damages amounts ranged from $100 million to $33.5 billion excluding the Engle case, 
with a high of $181.3 billion including Engle, which is the largest punitive damages 
award in the sample.  Compensatory damages averaged $368.8 million excluding the 
Engle case.  If we exclude both Engle v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. and Garamendi v. 
Altus Finance, S.A. in analyzing the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, 
the median ratio is 7.2, which is within the single digit ratio limit articulated in the State 
Farm decision.  However, the mean ratio is 502.4, while the maximum ratio is over 
43,000, so there clearly is very wide variation in the relationship between punitive 
damages and compensatory damages. 
Comparison of the statistics in Panels B and C of Table 5 indicates a possible 
effect of the State Farm decision on blockbuster awards.  The mean punitive 
damages/compensatory damages award ratio exhibits significant declines in Panel C as 17 
 
compared to Panel B.
30  The median value of this ratio also drops significantly for cases 
decided after the State Farm decision, and the median ratio is below the single-digit limit 
for cases decided since 2003 but above that limit for earlier awards.
31  These overall 
effects are suggestive of a State Farm effect but do not take into account other influences 
on the trend of punitive damages awards over this time period, which may also have led 
to lowering of award amounts and ratios in the absence of the case.   
The general patterns shown in Table 5 are also borne out if the Bullock case is 
excluded.  Unlike the Engle case and Garamendi v. Altus, the Bullock case has a 
meaningful positively valued compensatory damages award so that a valid ratio can be 
computed.  However, the Bullock case has an extremely high ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages that influences the average values for the sample.  As the 
statistics in Appendix Table A2 indicate, excluding the Bullock case has negligible effect 
on the median statistics, but lowers the mean punitive damages value to $826.8 million 
overall and to $1.0 billion before the State Farm decision.  The mean ratio of punitive 
damages to compensatory damages is 63.4 overall and 85.4 in the period before the State 
Farm decision without the Bullock award, compared to 502.4 and 717.7, respectively, 
with the award.  Both the mean ratio and the median ratio exhibit significant declines 
after the State Farm decision even if the Bullock case is excluded.
32   
 To explore the determinants of the number of blockbuster cases over time, Table 
6 presents the negative binomial regression results for the number of blockbuster punitive 
                                                 
30  The test statistic using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for equality of means for the ratio is z=3.51, 
which has a p-value of 0.0004.  The decline in the mean punitive damages amount is not statistically 
significant at the usual levels. 
31  The Pearson chi-squared test of the equality of the medians yields a chi-squared test statistic equal to 
6.92 (p-value=0.009) and equal to 5.81  (p-value=0.016) with a continuity correction.  
32  The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test statistic is z=3.44  (p-value=0.001). The Pearson chi-squared test 
statistic equals 6.60 (p-value=0.010) and equals 5.52 (p-value=0.019) with a continuity correction. 18 
 
damages awards by year, from 1985–2008.  The dependent variable, the number of 
awards in each year, is a discrete variable that involves a small number of counts, which 
sometimes take on a zero value.  Consequently, we use a negative binomial regression 
model, rather than using ordinary least squares, to estimate the effects of time-related 
variables on the number of blockbuster awards in any year.
 33 The coefficients, reported 
in Table 6, provide the estimated effect on the log of the expected number of cases in any 
year due to a one unit change in the variable.  Consequently, the exponential of the 
coefficient (minus 1) provides the percentage change in the number of cases for a one 
unit change in the variable.
34  
To control for the time trend in the volume of cases, the regressions in Table 6 
also include the number of civil court cases filed by year.
35 An alternative measure of the 
possible set of cases that might generate blockbuster awards would be the number of 
punitive damages awards generally, but these are not feasible to construct on an annual 
basis for the sample period. 
36 
                                                 
33 One cannot reject the hypothesis that the parameter α that serves as a measure of overdispersion in the 
negative binomial model equals zero. In all regressions, likelihood ratio tests (null hypothesis that alpha 
equals zero) yield chi-squared statistics virtually equal to zero. The Poisson model is a special case of the 
negative binomial model when alpha equals zero, and the negative binomial results in Table 6 are not 
distinguishable from Poisson estimates of the same equations. 
34 As an example, in the first equation of Table 6, the coefficient on the time trend variable is 0.140 and 
exp(0.140)=1.150.  Thus, each additional year increases the expected number of cases by 15 percent. 
35 These data are from the Court Statistics Project, State Court Caseload Statistics, 1985-2006. (National 
Center for State Courts 1985-2006.) Because data for 2007 and 2008 were unavailable, the number of civil 
filings was set equal to zero for those two years and an indicator for missing state filings is included in the 
regressions. Regressions excluding 2007 and 2008 yielded virtually identical results.  
36 Using data from the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts (CJSSC), it is possible to calculate the number 
of punitive damages awards by year for three years, but these data are samples of cases from large counties 
and not a census of cases from these counties.  The counties represented vary a bit over time, and in any 
given year the sampling procedure imposes caps on the number of case types to be included so that the 
comprehensive tallies in the National Center for State Courts data are a more meaningful index of civil case 
trends.  Only one “blockbuster” case is included in the CJSSC data.  Keeping these limitations in mind the 
total number of cases with nonzero values for punitive damages and compensatory damages was 184 in 
1992, 180 in 1996, and 153 in 2001.  The probability of a punitive damages award given a compensatory 
damages award is 0.056 in 1992, 0.040 in 1996, and 0.043 in 2001.  Authors’ calculations. 19 
 
The number of state civil suit filings is never statistically significant.  However, 
the time trend counter variable has a significant positive effect, indicating that the number 
of blockbuster awards increased over the 1985–2008 period.  Each year that elapses 
increases the number of punitive damages awards by about 14 to 15 percent.  However, 
there is a muting of such effects in the post-State Farm period from 2004–2008.  We use 
two different formulations to examine the effect of the State Farm decision on the annual 
number of blockbuster awards.  The result using an indicator variable for years after the 
State Farm decision implies that the number of blockbuster cases is 52 percent less in 
post-State Farm years, controlling for a general upward time trend (based on equation 1 
regression coefficient).  An alternative specification in equation 2, interacting the time 
trend with the After State Farm indicator, shows a statistically significant reduction in the 
upward temporal trend to an 11 percent increase per year post-State Farm.  The inclusion 
in equations 3 and 4 of an indicator variable for 1999, the year following the Master 
Settlement Agreement, reflects the spike in the number of cases (2.5 times the number of 
cases in other years), but it has little effect on general time trends.  Similarly, in results 
not reported here we found that an indicator variable for 1999-2008 (all years since the 
Master Settlement Agreement) is not statistically significant and does not eliminate the 
State Farm effect.   
Whether blockbuster awards are exhibiting any discernible trend depends not only 
on the number of awards in any year but also on their magnitude.  However, because of 
the enormous size of the outlier blockbuster award in the Engle case, the trend in the total 
value of punitive damages over time may be dominated by this extreme outlier.  To better 
reflect the trend in the award amounts by year, Figure 3A presents the total blockbuster 20 
 
award amounts by year for all cases, and Figure 3B excludes the Engle case.  In each 
instance blockbuster awards are on the rise, and as before, 1999 appears to be a year in 
which the awards increased compared to previous years.  The results in Figure 3B are 
more informative in that they make clear that the total value of blockbuster awards has 
been on the decline since 2002.  That year exhibited a spike due to the $28 billion award 
in the Bullock individual smoker case.  It is conceivable that the jurors confused millions 
for billions when setting the award level, and the trial judge reduced the punitive 
damages amount to $28 million.
37 Irrespective of the seemingly random factors that lead 
to such jury awards, there appears to be a consistent downward trend in the total scale of 
blockbuster damages in recent years.  To the extent that one defines crises in the courts in 
terms of trends in damages rather than simply absolute levels, then the fact that 
blockbuster damages are not on the rise but are perhaps becoming less prominent is an 
encouraging signal. 
  To attempt to place a magnitude on the trends of Figures 3A and 3B, we fit 
regressions of the total value of punitive damage awards per year.  Because of the skewed 
nature of the distribution of damages, the dependent variable is the natural log of 
blockbuster punitive damages in any given year.  In some years, the total blockbuster 
awards amount is zero.  We address this by adding 1 to the value of both compensatory 
damages and punitive damages in each year so that the regression results reported in 
Table 7 will be with respect to variables that have finite values.  We report Tobit 
estimates of the equation rather than ordinary least squares, and the coefficient estimate 
and marginal effects are both reported, although there is very little difference between the 
two.  The log total blockbuster award regression results in Table 7 include two 
                                                 
37 See p. 1450 of Viscusi (2004).  21 
 
specifications each using the entire sample and the sample excluding the Engle award.  
The marginal effect of ln(compensatory damages) is not significantly different from 1.0 
in each instance.  That is, one cannot reject the hypothesis that there is a unitary elasticity 
of blockbuster awards with respect to the value of compensatory awards, controlling for 
the other variables in the equation.  However, because this equation deals only with 
annual totals, the role of specific case characteristics is not taken into account. 
The first of the other included variables is the time trend variable, which has a 
positive effect that is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  Thus, while 
compensatory damages have a proportional influence on punitive damages, there is an 
additional upward drift in the total award amounts of 16 percent per year without the 
Engle award and about 23 percent per year including the Engle award even after 
controlling for inflation.   
We explored two different formulations for how the State Farm case might have 
affected total blockbuster punitive damages.  The first specification interacts the indicator 
variable for the post-State Farm era with the time trend variable, and the second 
specification interacts the State Farm indicator variable with ln(total compensatory 
damages), as the decision’s focus on punitive damages/compensatory damages ratios 
should have affected the relationship between punitive damages and compensatory 
damages.  Each of these formulations leads to a statistically significant negative effect for 
both the full sample of cases as well as the sample excluding the Engle case.
38 The time 
trend interaction with State Farm has a negative effect that eliminates about three-fourths 
of the upward temporal trend in the real value of total damages: total blockbuster awards 
                                                 
38 Inclusion of both of the State Farm interaction variables in the same equation did not lead to statistically 
significant effects. 22 
 
increase at a rate of 5 percent per year post-State Farm (3 percent excluding the Engle 
award).  Alternatively, if one formulates the effect of State Farm in terms of how total 
compensatory damages are linked to total punitive damages, the effect is to dramatically 
reduce the elasticity from about 1.0 to the range of 0.5-0.6.  The latter elasticities are 
different from unitary elasticity at a significance level of 5 percent or better.  From either 
perspective, the State Farm decision dampened the total value of blockbuster punitive 
damages as well as reducing the number of blockbuster punitive damages awards in any 
year.   
In contrast to the number of blockbuster awards per year, there is little evidence 
that the annual magnitude of the awards has been affected by the Master Settlement 
Agreement.  In results that are not reported, neither an indicator variable for 1999 nor an 
indicator for the post- Master Settlement Agreement years is statistically significant when 
controlling for a general time trend and the level of total compensatory damages.   
 
4.  Determinants of Awards in Individual Cases 
In addition to analyzing the determinants in the annual trends in the number and 
level of blockbuster awards, it is instructive to analyze the individual awards themselves.  
Doing so expands the range of questions that can be examined, such as whether particular 
industries have been especially hard hit by blockbuster awards.   
The particular hypotheses being explored are conditional in nature.  Given that 
there was a blockbuster punitive damages award in a particular case, did the 
characteristics of the case influence the magnitude of the award? This is a quite different 
issue than determining whether a particular case type is likely to lead to a blockbuster 23 
 
punitive damages award.  Answering that question would require a quite different sample 
of cases, including those without blockbuster punitive damages awards, to determine 
whether some cases are more likely to generate a blockbuster punitive damages award 
and, if so, how large an award this will be.
39  
The first dependent variable in the regression analysis in this section is the value 
of ln(punitive damages) for each particular case.  In contrast, the regressions above 
focused on the natural log of total damages for all cases in each year.  Because the 
relationship between punitive damages and compensatory damages is a central concern, 
we exclude from the sample the Garamendi v. Altus Finance, S.A. case in which there 
were no compensatory damages; thus, the sample consists of 99 observations.  We 
include the Engle case in the regression but add a separate interaction of Engle with the 
compensatory damages variable in recognition of the narrower scope of the 
compensatory damages amount as compared to the class-wide punitive damages amount. 
Below we present sensitivity tests, excluding the Engle case.
 40 
Table 8 reports four sets of OLS regression results.  Each equation includes the 
ln(compensatory damages) and the interaction of this variable with the Engle case for that 
observation.  Equations 2 and 4 include the non-overlapping indicator variables for the 
violent crime cases and the following five major industry groups: automobiles; cigarettes; 
energy and chemicals; finance, investment, and insurance; and pharmaceuticals and 
                                                 
39 Two previous studies, Hersch and Viscusi (2004) and Viscusi (2004), explored these relationships using 
earlier samples of blockbuster cases. These authors found no significant relation between punitive damages 
and compensatory damages for the sample.  However, there is a significant relationship between the log of 
punitive damages and the log of compensatory damages, as well as a tobacco case dummy variable.  See 
Eisenberg and Wells (2006).  All three of these articles relate more generally to the issue of predictability 
of punitive damages.  For another perspective on the predictability of punitive damages and what is meant 
by predictability, see Polinsky (1997). 
40 In addition, we examine regressions that exclude all cigarette cases, exclude bench awards, and include 
the Garamendi v. Altus Finance, S.A. award.
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health care.  The omitted category is “other industries.” An indicator for cases involving 
an individual plaintiff against a business or corporate defendant is included.  There are 
also indicator variables for the two most prominent states in the tally of blockbuster 
punitive damages—California and Texas.  In addition, the five cases involving a bench 
trial are distinguished.  Equations 3 and 4 include a post-State Farm interaction with the 
value of ln(compensatory damages) to test whether on an individual case basis the State 
Farm decision reduced the extent to which compensatory damages are transmitted into 
punitive damages awards.  For these results and all other OLS regressions, robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses and bootstrapped standard errors are in 
brackets.
41  The significance levels for the coefficients are quite similar for each, so for 
concreteness our discussion will focus on the robust standard errors. 
Controlling for industry and other case characteristics, the overall elasticity of 
punitive damages with respect to compensatory damages is between 0.21 and 0.26.  This 
level is far less responsive than the unitary elasticity implied by the aggregate annual data 
regression results.  The State Farm interaction with ln(compensatory damages) is 
negative and statistically significant, and exhibits a small change in magnitude when case 
characteristics are included.  In equation 3, without detailed control variables, the null 
hypothesis that the sum of the State Farm interaction term and the ln(compensatory 
damages) coefficients, 0.04, equals zero cannot be rejected.  Equation 4 results suggest 
that the elasticity has declined from 0.26 prior to the Supreme Court decision to 0.13 after 
the ruling (and the latter estimated elasticity is significantly different from zero at the 5 
percent level).   
                                                 
41 The bootstrapped standard errors for each regression in Tables 8 through 11 are based on 1,000 
replications. 25 
 
We performed several other regressions reported in Table 9 to test the robustness 
of the effects of this U.S. Supreme Court decision.  Two alternative specifications 
provide similar evidence of a negative effect of the State Farm decision on blockbuster 
awards.  Including a time trend and interaction of the trend with a post-State Farm 
indicator variable yields no significant time trend prior to the ruling, and a 4-5 percent 
decrease in the size of the punitive awards for each year after the State Farm decision.  
An indicator variable for the post-State Farm years is negative and statistically significant 
and shows a 49 percent decline in punitive award levels after State Farm compared to 
cases heard before the 2003 decision.  Finally, in results not reported, because the State 
Farm decision was a state court case, we added an indicator for cases heard in state 
courts and an interaction of state cases with the post-State Farm indicator variable.  
Although the coefficient of the indicator for state cases is consistently negative, it and the 
interaction variable are never statistically significant.   
Industry characteristics, rather than the level of compensatory damages alone, 
appear to account for much of the variation in punitive damages in the results in Tables 8 
and 9.
42  Moreover, the pattern of industry or product type effects is consistent with the 
general perceptions of which industries have been hardest hit by very large punitive 
damages awards.  By far the greatest effect is for the cigarette industry, for which the 
punitive award is over 14 times the value of the omitted other industries category.
43 Next 
                                                 
42 Although the results are similar in Table 9, for concreteness we focus on the implications of the results in 
Table 8 (equation 4, specifically) when calculating the magnitude of these effects. 
43 Because the dependent variable is a natural log and the industry variables are indicator variables, the 
factor by which punitive damages awards are increased (compared to the excluded category) is equal to the 
exponential of the coefficient.  For cigarettes cases above,  , 426 . 14 ) 669 . 2 exp( = so punitive awards are 
over 14 times greater than those of other industries, holding all else fixed.  Alternatively, the percent 
difference attributed to an indicator variable is found by subtracting one from the exponential of the 
coefficient of the indicator variable and multiplying by 100.  For example, the percent difference in 26 
 
in prominence are the energy and chemical industry grouping and the finance, 
investment, and insurance industry, which experience blockbuster awards over 130 
percent greater than the other industries category.  The pharmaceutical and health care 
cases also have a positive blockbuster premium of over 100 percent.  The violent crime 
cases have a similar premium.   
The one included case type category that does not have a statistically significant 
premium relative to the other industries category is the automobile industry.  This lack of 
a differential effect is not surprising as the automobile cases tend to be more routine.  
These cases involve lower transactions costs than other cases and have generally not been 
associated with the various tort liability crises.
44 While products liability generally has 
received substantial attention among tort reformers, within the class of products, 
automobiles have a less prominent role than, for example, pharmaceutical products and 
medical devices.   
Cases involving an apparent mismatch of an individual against a corporate entity 
generate larger blockbuster damages than those involving more equally matched parties 
of the same general class.  The indicator variable for cases involving an individual 
against a business entity has a positive effect, ranging from 61 to 66 percent in the fourth 
columns of Tables 8 and 9, respectively.  
The other included variables in Tables 8 and 9 are not statistically significant, but 
their lack of significance is of some interest as well.  Although California and Texas are 
distinguished by the greatest number of blockbuster awards, controlling for compensatory 
                                                                                                                                                 
punitive damages for cases involving the finance, investment and insurance industry compared to the 
excluded category of other industries, is  130 100 ] 1 ) 834 . 0 [exp( = − x  percent.   
44 Kakalik and Pace (1986) and Hensler et al. (1987) review the role of different lines of litigation, such as 
automobile cases. 27 
 
damages, industry type, and other factors, there is no statistically significant difference in 
the performance of these states.
45 Similarly, the coefficient for bench trials is not 
statistically significant, but there are only five bench trials in the sample, which may limit 
our ability to estimate this effect precisely.  Finally, in results that are not reported, 
adding indicators for 1999 only or for 1999-2008 does not change the results described 
above, and these indicators are never statistically significant.  The Master Settlement 
Agreement appears to have had no discernable effect on blockbuster punitive damages 
awards.   
Table 10 reports results from several empirical tests checking the robustness of 
our results across different samples.  The first equation excludes the Engle case from the 
sample, but doing so does not alter the statistical significance of any of the coefficients.  
Excluding all cigarette cases likewise yields results that are very similar to the full sample 
results.  With the five bench trials excluded from the sample, punitive damages are more 
responsive to compensatory damages: the comparable elasticities are 0.30 for pre-State 
Farm and 0.15 for post-State Farm cases.  Also, the level of punitive damages awarded in 
cigarette cases is of much higher magnitude in the jury trial only sample: the coefficient 
of 3.245 means that punitive damages in cigarette cases, holding fixed compensatory 
damages, are 26 times higher than other industry punitive damages (compared to a factor 
of 14 for the sample that includes bench awards).  The coefficient on the indicator for 
individual and business litigants is slightly larger than the full sample results and is now 
significant at the 5 percent level in equation 3.  Juries award punitive damages that are 68 
percent higher to individual plaintiffs in cases in which they are matched against business 
                                                 
45 An indicator for Alabama cases, the second highest in total punitive damage awards, also was never 
statistically significant. 28 
 
defendants, compared to 61 percent higher in the full sample (equation 4, Table 8), 
perhaps reflecting greater consideration by juries of the relative deepness of the 
defendant’s pockets compared to the individual plaintiff’s.   
In order to include Garamendi v. Altus Finance, S.A., the case with compensatory 
damages equal to 0, we added $1 to the compensatory damages and punitive damages for 
each case before logging each variable.  There were few changes in the magnitude or 
statistical significance of coefficient estimates, but there is a reduction in the coefficient 
on ln(compensatory damages).  With the Altus Finance award included, the elasticity of 
punitive damages with respect to compensatory damages decreases to 0.19 pre-State 
Farm and drops to 0.03 for cases decided after the State Farm decision. 
  A central focus of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the State Farm and Exxon 
Shipping Co. cases has been on the ratio of punitive damages/compensatory damages.  
The regression results in Table 11 examine the determinants of the natural log of this 
ratio.
46  Due to the outlier status of the ratio of Bullock v. Philip Morris, Inc., we present 
equations with and without that case, and in equations 1 and 2 we also include an 
indicator for the Engle award due to its unique limitation of compensatory damages 
values to the class representatives, as discussed previously.  Equation 3 excludes both the 
Engle and Bullock awards. In contrast to the level of punitive damage regressions, there is 
some weak evidence that bench awards have lower ratios than jury awards, although the 
coefficients are not quite statistically significant, with p-values equal to 0.13 using robust 
                                                 
46 Regressions using the level of the ratio rather than the natural log of the ratio yielded no statistically 
significant results if the Bullock case is included. Without the Bullock case or without Bullock and Engle 
several coefficients are statistically significant. The cigarette industry and the finance, investment, 
insurance industry have higher ratios (at the 5 percent level of significance). Violent crime cases and cases 
involving individual versus business litigants have higher ratios (at the 10 percent level of significance). In 
addition, ratios are lower for cases in the post-State Farm era (at the 10 percent level of significance) using 
these subsamples.  29 
 
standard errors.  There is some evidence that cases involving some groups of defendants 
have higher ratios, specifically cases against the cigarette industry, the finance, 
investment and insurance industry, and perpetrators of violent crimes.  However, the 
cigarette industry coefficient estimate is not statistically significant if the Bullock 
cigarette case is excluded.  In general, fewer of the industry indicator variables are 
statistically significant. The results seem to suggest that in blockbuster punitive damages 
cases juries (and judges) are more likely to penalize certain industries by changing the 
absolute magnitude of the punitive damages rather than the ratio of punitive to 
compensatory damages.  The results in Table 11 indicate that cases involving individuals 
against a business opponent have a ratio that is 5.7 to 6 times higher than cases involving 
only business or government litigants.  Consistent with the results from the level of 
punitive damages regressions, the State Farm decision has resulted in a decrease of 75 
percent in the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages. 
 
5.  An Examination and Simulation of the Effect of U.S. Supreme Court Ratio Limits  
The final Table 12 presents a closer examination of the two recent Supreme Court 
decisions regarding the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages.  The Engle case is 
excluded from this analysis once again.  Under the 2003 State Farm decision, the Court 
indicated that few ratios above a single-digit limit would pass due process.  As can be 
seen in Panel A of Table 12, 45 cases or 45 percent of the blockbuster punitive awards’ 
ratios exceed the single-digit limit, where these cases account for 74 percent of the total 
punitive damages award amounts, $84.3  billion.  If the awards were capped at nine times 
the compensatory damages, the total punitive damages awards of those 45 cases would 30 
 
have been $9.6 billion, or about 11 percent of the actual award amounts.  This constraint 
would have resulted in $39.9 billion in total punitive damages being levied, compared to 
the $114.5 billion actual total of punitive damages, so that only 35 percent of the actual 
total awards would remain.  Under the State Farm single-digit ratio limit, 66 cases can 
still be defined as “blockbuster” cases in the sense that their nominal punitive damages 
awards are greater than or equal to $100 million with the cap imposed, including 12 cases 
whose actual punitive damages awards are over the single-digit ratio limit.   
In the 2008 Exxon Shipping Co. decision, a valid ratio, at least for maritime cases, 
was limited to 1:1.  A more general restriction of the ratio to less than or equal to 1:1  
would reduce the awards in 84 cases (or 85 percent of the 99 cases).  Limiting punitive 
damages awards to be no greater than the compensatory awards would reduce the total 
awards of those cases from $99.9 billion to $6.1 billion, and would decrease the overall 
blockbuster punitive amount to $20.7 billion, which is 18 percent of the actual total 
awards.  Under the Exxon Shipping Co. ratio limit, 35 cases or 35 percent of the 99 
awards can still be defined as “blockbuster” cases with the cap imposed; this number 
includes 20 cases whose actual punitive damages are over the 1:1 limit and 15 cases with 
actual ratios less than 1.  Adoption of a unitary ratio for punitive damages to 
compensatory damages as an upper bound would have far more sweeping effects on 
blockbuster awards than a single-digit ratio.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
Just over two decades ago, blockbuster awards were unprecedented.  However, 
the upsurge in the number and scale of blockbuster awards may be tapering off from its 31 
 
peak level.  A diverse series of statistical analyses indicates that the upward trend in 
blockbuster awards may have been dampened by the U.S. Supreme Court’s State Farm 
decision.  That 2003 decision provides guidelines to limit the ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages, suggesting that a single-digit upper limit should be the usual 
norm.  From 2004 onward, the total number of blockbuster awards per year and the 
growth in the total value of the blockbuster awards in any given year tapered off.  
Controlling for the total value of compensatory damages in each year, the upward time 
trend in these values has been significantly reduced.  Also, the magnitude of the 
relationship between aggregate punitive damages and compensatory damages in recent 
blockbuster cases is almost half that of years prior to the State Farm decision, which is 
consistent with the State Farm decision’s focus on bringing punitive damages to be more 
in line with the value of compensatory damages. 
We find more evidence that the State Farm case has affected punitive damages 
awards through examination of the level of the individual awards given that a blockbuster 
award has been made, as the elasticity of punitive awards to compensatory awards has 
been reduced by more than half.  A similar negative effect of the State Farm decision is 
found by examining case-specific ratios of punitive damages to compensatory damages.   
Capping punitive damages using either of the Supreme Court’s recent ratio limits 
in the State Farm decision and the Exxon Shipping Co. decision would have a large 
dampening effect on the total amount of blockbuster punitive damages awards and would 
eliminate many of the cases from the category of blockbuster cases.  If strictly applied, 
limiting the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages to 1:1 would eliminate 
about two-thirds of the cases from the $100 million blockbuster category. 32 
 
Analysis of the pattern of blockbuster awards yields a variety of insights into the 
performance of the civil justice system more generally.  Punitive damages are responsive 
to the level of compensatory damages overall, but after controlling for factors such as 
industry effects, this relationship is greatly reduced.  Instead, the levels of punitive 
damages are often driven not by the level of compensatory damages but by the particular 
industry involved, as certain types of products and services seem to fare particularly 
badly.
47 Controlling for the level of compensatory damages, the industries that are 
particularly hard hit are: the cigarette industry; the energy and chemical industry; the 
finance, investment and insurance industry; and the pharmaceutical and health care 
industry.  These well known litigation targets tended to fare less well than the automobile 
industry or miscellaneous other industry groups.  This difference is consistent with 
differential effects of the civil justice system for different segments of the economy.  
Despite some reduction in the growth of blockbuster punitive awards and in the elasticity 
of punitive damages with respect to compensatory damages, case-specific characteristics, 
such as the identity of the litigants, result in punitive damages awards that vary greatly 
across cases.  Many awards remain extremely high by any standard.   
 
                                                 
47 Empirical tests not reported here also explored whether the nature of the harm—personal injury, 
environmental harm, or financial harm—accounted for such a relationship, but these variables were not 
statistically significant. 33 
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Figure 3B. Total Blockbuster Punitive Damages, Excluding Engle Case 
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Table 2. Damages and Ratio by Industry Type
a 
 












Automobile Industry  9  900.71  160.89  19.12 
Cigarette Industry
b 5  10,240.92  2,078.87  11,125.31 
Energy, Chemical Industry  25  1,531.59  701.61  90.09 
Finance, Investment, Insurance Industry
c  23 546.33  222.45 59.20 
Pharmaceuticals, Health Care Industry  16  503.69  109.29  40.98 
Violent Crime  7  350.05  114.49  19.87 
Other Industry  15  273.63  103.00  13.82 
 
a Damages are calculated as millions of 2008 dollars.  
b For the cigarette industry, all columns exclude the Engle award.  
c For the finance, investment, insurance industry, the mean ratio excludes Garamendi v. Altus 





















Alabama  6            16,822            3,749  
Alaska  2              7,257          11,997  
Arizona  1                 156                 25  
California  21            49,731            1,439  
Colorado  1                 214                 45  
Florida  8              2,773               163  
Georgia  4              1,177               145  
Illinois  4              4,834               386  
Kentucky  1                 288                 74  
Louisiana  2              5,730            1,293  
Maryland  4              1,565               313  
Mississippi  3                 960               351  
Missouri  3              2,674               472  
Nevada  2                 655               252  
New York  2              2,618               136  
North Carolina  1                 206                 27  
Ohio  1                 293                 26  
Oregon  3                 690               188  
Pennsylvania  2              1,394               115  
South Carolina  1                 335                 87  
Tennessee  1                 456                 77  
Texas  20            11,505               629  
Utah  1                 199                 96  
West Virginia  3                 588               325  
Wisconsin  2              1,422               267  
Total  99          114,539   --- 
 
a Damages are calculated as millions of 2008 dollars. Figures for Florida (and 
the totals) exclude the Engle award.  













a    
Punitive Damages        2,958.3          18,397.3  
Compensatory Damages           365.3            1,719.9  
Ratio of Punitive/Compensatory Damages
b           612.6            4,464.6  
Ln(Punitive Damages)               6.0                   1.3  
Ln(Compensatory Damages)               3.7                   2.0  
State    
California   21%   
Texas   20%   
Industry Involved    
Automobile Industry  9%   
Cigarette Industry  5%   
Energy, Chemical Industry  25%   
Financial, Investment, Insurance Industry  23%   
Pharmaceuticals, Health Care Industry  16%   
Violent Crime  7%   
Other Industry  15%   
Type of Damages Sought    
Personal Injury or Fatality  40%   
Environmental/Property 10%   
Other Monetary Damage  50%   
Pairs of Litigants    
Individual and Business Litigants  53%   
Two Business or Government Litigants  41%   
Two Individual Litigants  6%   
Other Case Information    
Bench Trial  5%   
After State Farm 31%     
 
a Damages are calculated as millions of 2008 dollars. All calculations include the 
Engle award (N=100).  
b The statistics for the ratio of punitive/compensatory damages exclude the 
Garamendi v. Altus Finance, S.A. award, which has zero compensatory damages. 
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Panel A. Full Sample (N=99) 
Mean 1,156.96  368.84  502.35 
Standard Deviation  3,757.20  1,728.32  4350.00 
Minimum 100.00  0.00  0.31 
Maximum 33,509.73  15,067.00  43076.93 
Median 257.76  40.00  7.15 
Panel B. Before State Farm Decision (N=68) 
Mean 1,519.18  455.95  717.66 
Standard Deviation  4,490.41  2,079.06  5219.31 
Minimum 117.01  0.20  0.31 
Maximum 33,509.73  15,067.00  43076.93 
Median 267.91  29.85  12.26 
Panel C. After State Farm Decision (N=31) 
Mean 362.43  177.76  14.30 
Standard Deviation  363.09  222.30  28.82 
Minimum 100.00  0.00  0.36 
Maximum 1,823.61  1,031.11  100.00 
Median 250.00  129.19  2.04 
 
a Damages are calculated as millions of 2008 dollars. All columns exclude the 
Engle award.  
b The ratio statistics in Panels A and C are calculated without Garamendi v. Altus 









Table 6. Negative Binomial Regressions of the Number of Blockbuster Punitive 
Damages Awards by Year
a 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time  0.140 0.140 0.135 0.135 
 (0.025)**  (0.025)**  (0.023)** (0.023)** 
After State Farm -0.734    -0.652   
 (0.165)**    (0.135)**   
Time x After State Farm   -0.035    -0.031 
   (0.008)**    (0.006)** 
Millions of State Filings  0.022  0.022  -0.025  -0.025 
  (0.059) (0.059) (0.049) (0.049) 
Missing State Filings  0.098  0.185  -0.681  -0.603 
  (0.978) (0.984) (0.830) (0.830) 
Indicator for 1999      0.940  0.939 
     (0.160)**  (0.160)** 
Constant -0.788  -0.795  0.035  0.028 
  (1.195) (1.198) (0.991) (0.993) 
Observations  24 24 24 24 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.222 0.223 0.276 0.276 
 
a  Dependent variable is the number of blockbuster punitive damages awards in each year, 
1985-2008. Estimated using negative binomial regression. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.    
+Significant at the 10% level; *significant at the 5% level; and **significant at the 1% 








Table 7. Tobit Regressions of Total Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards by Year
a 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 






Ln(Total  Compensatory  Damages)  0.974 0.984 0.984 0.991 
 (0.156)**  (0.157)**  (0.133)** (0.134)** 
 [0.974]
c [0.983]  [0.984]  [0.991] 
Time  0.226 0.218 0.161 0.155 
 (0.0817)*  (0.0813)*  (0.0700)* (0.0695)* 
  [0.226] [0.218] [0.161] [0.155] 
Time x After State Farm -0.173    -0.128   
 (0.0542)**   (0.0465)*   
 [-0.173]    [-0.128]   
Ln(Total Compensatory Damages)     -0.534    -0.396 
     x After State Farm   (0.172)**    (0.147)* 
   [-0.534]    [-0.396] 
Constant -0.341  -0.312  0.0412  0.0630 
  (0.921) (0.927) (0.784) (0.787) 
Observations  24 24 24 24 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.314 0.311 0.349 0.347 
 
a Dependent variable is ln(total blockbuster punitive damages + 1) for 1985-2008. Estimated 
using Tobit regression. Standard errors in parentheses.  
b Equations 3 and 4 exclude the Engle award from the totals of punitive and compensatory 
damages (for the year 2000).  
c Estimated marginal effects (changes in the conditional expected value of the dependent 
variable) given in brackets. 





Table 8. Regressions of Individual Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards
a 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Compensatory  Damages)  0.129 0.205 0.192 0.260 
 (0.0765)+  (0.0706)** (0.0785)*  (0.0761)**
 [0.0753]+  [0.0731]** [0.0810]* [0.0796]**
Ln(Compensatory Damages) x Engle  2.288 1.504 2.236 1.463 
 (0.0519)** (0.352)**  (0.0559)**  (0.358)** 
 [1.110]*  [0.797]+  [1.091]* [0.780]+ 
Ln(Compensatory Damages)       -0.152  -0.129 
     x After State Farm     (0.0453)**  (0.0492)* 
     [0.0463]**  [0.0503]* 
Automobile  Industry   0.283   0.281 
   (0.381)   (0.374) 
   [0.395]   [0.397] 
Cigarette  Industry   2.696   2.669 
   (0.966)**   (0.992)** 
   [1.179]*   [1.228]* 
Energy, Chemical Industry    0.888    0.840 
   (0.336)**   (0.307)** 
   [0.342]**   [0.320]** 
Finance, Investment, Insurance Industry   0.862    0.834 
   (0.244)**   (0.251)** 
   [0.265]**   [0.264]** 
Pharmaceuticals, Health Care Industry    0.613    0.700 
   (0.325)+   (0.314)* 
   [0.334]+   [0.320]* 
Violent  Crime   0.472   0.645 
   (0.327)   (0.305)* 
   [0.346]   [0.322]* 
Individual and Business Litigants    0.486    0.474 
   (0.265)+   (0.252)+ 
   [0.269]+   [0.259]+ 
California   0.284   0.227 
   (0.296)   (0.290) 
   [0.305]   [0.311] 
Texas   -0.318   -0.353 
   (0.275)   (0.261) 
   [0.285]   [0.274] 
Bench Trial    0.0443    -0.188 
   (0.393)   (0.388) 
   [0.481]   [0.548] 
Constant  5.423 4.201 5.396 4.201 
  (0.319)** (0.434)** (0.312)** (0.414)** 
 [0.323]**  [0.456]**  [0.316]** [0.438]** 
Observations  99 99 99 99 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.248 0.396 0.297 0.428 
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a Dependent variable is ln(punitive damages). Excluded industry category is other industry. 
Excludes Garamendi v. Altus Finance, S.A. award. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses, and bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets.  
+Significant at the 10% level; *significant at the 5% level; and **significant at the 1% 




Table 9. Regressions of Individual Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards:
 
Alternative Specifications of Post-State Farm Effects
a 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Compensatory  Damages)  0.172 0.245 0.164 0.240 
  (0.0710)* (0.0697)** (0.0733)* (0.0707)**
 [0.0701]*  [0.0723]** [0.0712]* [0.0725]**
Ln(Compensatory Damages) x Engle  2.194 1.492 2.225 1.477 
 (0.0743)** (0.357)**  (0.0594)**  (0.354)** 
 [1.059]*  [0.789]+  [1.062]* [0.778]+ 
Time 0.0364  0.0196     
 (0.0337)  (0.0340)     
 [0.0355]  [0.0332]     
Time x After State Farm -0.0460  -0.0359     
 (0.0172)** (0.0174)*     
 [0.0177]** [0.0171]*     
After State Farm     -0.677  -0.603 
     (0.208)**  (0.232)* 
     [0.208]**  [0.236]* 
Automobile  Industry   0.249   0.246 
   (0.370)   (0.366) 
   [0.366]   [0.401] 
Cigarette  Industry   2.543   2.621 
   (0.992)*   (0.977)** 
   [1.188]*   [1.156]* 
Energy, Chemical Industry    0.885    0.862 
   (0.322)**   (0.308)** 
   [0.305]**   [0.312]** 
Finance, Investment, Insurance Industry   0.864    0.839 
   (0.251)**   (0.254)** 
   [0.252]**   [0.259]** 
Pharmaceuticals, Health Care Industry    0.728    0.750 
   (0.314)*   (0.320)* 
   [0.313]*   [0.320]* 
Violent  Crime   0.869   0.832 
   (0.288)**   (0.295)** 
   [0.310]**   [0.321]** 
Individual and Business Litigants    0.513    0.505 
   (0.248)*   (0.254)+ 
   [0.246]*   [0.256]* 
California   0.288   0.267 
   (0.285)   (0.290) 
   [0.311]   [0.300] 
Texas   -0.313   -0.331 
   (0.257)   (0.267) 
   [0.267]   [0.274] 57 
 
Bench  Trial   -0.170   -0.144 
   (0.371)   (0.386) 
   [0.462]   [0.521] 
Constant  4.983 3.935 5.503 4.234 
  (0.421)** (0.575)** (0.312)** (0.414)** 
 [0.459]**  [0.596]**  [0.299]** [0.425]** 
Observations  99 99 99 99 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.303 0.427 0.295 0.428 
 
a Dependent variable is ln(punitive damages). Excluded industry category is other 
industry. Equations exclude Garamendi v. Altus Finance, S.A. award. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses, and bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets.   








  (1) (2) (3) (4) 









Ln(Compensatory  Damages)  0.260 0.288 0.299 0.192 
 (0.0757)** (0.0734)** (0.0826)**  (0.0698)**
 [0.0787]** [0.0776]** [0.0825]** [0.0791]* 
Ln(Compensatory Damages) x Engle     1.259 1.484 
     (0.430)**  (0.355)** 
     [0.759]+  [0.780]+ 
Ln(Compensatory  Damages)    -0.129 -0.141 -0.139 -0.159 
     x After State Farm (0.0490)*  (0.0479)** (0.0505)**  (0.0541)**
 [0.0488]** [0.0504]** [0.0497]**  [0.0590]**
Automobile  Industry  0.281 0.326 0.287 0.316 
  (0.372) (0.380) (0.374) (0.394) 
  [0.389] [0.394] [0.388] [0.410] 
Cigarette Industry  2.669    3.245  2.561 
 (0.987)**    (1.195)**  (0.981)* 
 [1.255]*    [1.529]* [1.219]* 
Energy,  Chemical  Industry  0.840 0.849 0.845 0.839 
  (0.305)** (0.301)** (0.322)*  (0.306)** 
 [0.302]**  [0.290]** [0.328]*  [0.312]** 
Finance,  Investment,  Insurance  Industry 0.834 0.786 0.804 0.821 
  (0.250)** (0.246)** (0.278)** (0.261)** 
 [0.272]**  [0.255]**  [0.283]** [0.272]** 
Pharmaceuticals,  Health  Care  Industry  0.700 0.741 0.718 0.733 
 (0.312)*  (0.308)*  (0.328)* (0.311)* 
 [0.318]*  [0.316]*  [0.325]* [0.320]* 
Violent  Crime  0.645 0.651 0.698 0.599 
 (0.304)*  (0.284)*  (0.295)* (0.343)+ 
 [0.322]*  [0.307]*  [0.326]* [0.362]+ 
Individual  and  Business  Litigants  0.474 0.448 0.518 0.319 
  (0.251)+ (0.250)+ (0.256)* (0.246) 
  [0.256]+ [0.257]+ [0.253]* [0.267] 
California  0.227 0.0123  0.198 0.225 
  (0.289) (0.266) (0.292) (0.299) 
  [0.297] [0.280] [0.303] [0.323] 
Texas  -0.353 -0.417 -0.350 -0.396 
  (0.260) (0.254) (0.275) (0.266) 
  [0.263] [0.259] [0.270] [0.272] 
Bench Trial  -0.188  0.137    -0.0832 
 (0.386)  (0.253)    (0.373) 
 [0.547]  [0.293]    [0.522] 59 
 
Constant  4.201 4.165 4.036 4.594 
  (0.412)** (0.411)** (0.440)** (0.387)** 
 [0.432]**  [0.428]**  [0.437]** [0.437]** 
Observations  98 94 94  100 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.270 0.206 0.421 0.399 
 
a Dependent variable is ln(punitive damages). Excluded industry category is other 
industry. Equations 1, 2 and 3 exclude the Garamendi v. Altus Finance, S.A. award. 
Equation 4 adds $1 to the punitive and compensatory damages before logging each 
variable, and includes the Garamendi v. Altus Finance, S.A. award.  Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses, and bootstrapped standard errors are in brackets. 
 +Significant at the 10% level; *significant at the 5% level; and **significant at the 1% 
level, two-tailed tests. 
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 Table 11. Regressions of the Ln(Ratio of Punitive to Compensatory Damages)
a 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 




No Bullock or 
Engle Award 
Engle Case  3.544  4.921   
 (1.593)*  (1.547)**   
 [2.266]  [2.844]+   
After State Farm -1.405  -1.403  -1.403 
 (0.380)**  (0.381)**  (0.379)** 
 [0.385]**  [0.368]**  [0.380]** 
Automobile Industry  -0.149  -0.106  -0.106 
 (0.464)  (0.456)  (0.453) 
 [0.478]  [0.483]  [0.483] 
Cigarette Industry  3.323  1.934  1.934 
 (1.655)*  (1.578)  (1.570) 
 [2.088]  [1.958]  [1.957] 
Energy, Chemical Industry  0.788  0.798  0.798 
 (0.527)  (0.521)  (0.518) 
 [0.523]  [0.535]  [0.516] 
Finance, Investment, Insurance Industry 1.531  1.478  1.478 
 (0.502)**  (0.484)**  (0.481)** 
 [0.495]**  [0.494]**  [0.516]** 
Pharmaceuticals, Health Care Industry  0.855  0.882  0.882 
 (0.617)  (0.607)  (0.603) 
 [0.616]  [0.615]  [0.615] 
Violent Crime  2.118  2.087  2.087 
 (0.535)**  (0.539)**  (0.536)** 
 [0.550]**  [0.590]**  [0.565]** 
Individual and Business Litigants  1.799  1.748  1.748 
 (0.376)**  (0.366)**  (0.364)** 
 [0.374]**  [0.365]**  [0.376]** 
California 0.857  0.673  0.673 
 (0.487)+  (0.463)  (0.461) 
 [0.471]+  [0.465]  [0.472] 
Texas -0.0326  -0.0885  -0.0885 
 (0.437)  (0.428)  (0.426) 
 [0.441]  [0.426]  [0.423] 
Bench Trial  -1.989  -1.691  -1.691 
 (1.303)  (1.113)  (1.107) 
 [1.565]  [1.423]  [1.366] 
Constant 0.677  0.740  0.740 
 (0.410)  (0.406)+  (0.404)+ 
 [0.410]+  [0.415]+  [0.400]+ 
Observations 99  98  97 
Adjusted R-squared  0.397  0.354  0.268 61 
 
a Dependent variable is ln(punitive damages/compensatory damages). 
Excluded industry category is other industry. Excludes Garamendi v. Altus 
Finance, S.A. in all equations, excludes Bullock v. Philip Morris, Inc. in 
equation 2, and excludes the Bullock award and the Engle award in equation 
3.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and bootstrapped standard 
errors are in brackets.  
+Significant at the 10% level; *significant at the 5% level; and **significant 
at the 1% level, two-tailed tests. 
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Table 12. Effects of U.S. Supreme Court Ratio Limits
a 
 
Panel A. Punitive/Compensatory Damage Ratio < 10 
 Actual  Awards 




Ratio < 10 
Cases with 
Ratio ≥ 10  All Cases 
Cases with 
Ratio ≥ 10  All Cases 
Mean  560.45   1,872.78   1,156.96   213.49   402.74  
Median   251.28   267.53   257.76   57.67   156.56  
Total Awards  30,264.04   84,275.28   114,539.30   9,607.13   39,871.16  
Percent of Total  26.42  73.58  100  24.10  100 
Number  of  Awards  54  45 99  45 99 
Percent of Awards  54.55  45.45  100  45.45  100 
          
Panel B. Punitive/Compensatory Damage Ratio ≤ 1 
 Actual  Awards 




Ratio ≤ 1 
Cases with 
Ratio > 1  All Cases 
Cases with 
Ratio > 1  All Cases 
Mean   974.50   1,189.55   1,156.96   72.76   209.38  
Median   236.10   267.91   257.76   26.05   40.00  
Total Awards  14,617.46   99,921.85   114,539.30   6,111.54   20,729.00  
Percent of Total  12.76 87.24  100  29.48  100 
Number of Cases  15 84  99  84  99 
Percent of Cases  15.15 84.85  100  84.85  100 
 
 
a Damages are calculated as millions of 2008 dollars. All columns exclude the Engle 
award. Garamendi v. Altus Finance, S.A., which has zero compensatory damages, is 
included in the statistics for all cases and for cases with a ratio exceeding the limit.  
 
 
 
 